|
 The
story begins in the summer of 1943 when Allied victories in North
Africa and Sicily made it necessary to redefine strategy in the
Mediterranean. Because Great Britain looked upon the Mediterranean
differently than the United States—it was after all a lifeline of
empire—its influence gradually predominated. America was more
concerned with invading Western Europe and sought to limit its
adventures in the Mediterranean. Before long-term Allied strategy
could be agreed to, the British Eighth Army invaded Italy across the
Straits of Messina. Regardless of intentions, once started the
Italian campaign took on a life of its own. By the fall of 1943
Allied armies had reached the German Gustav Line anchored on
Cassino. Beyond that was the Liri valley leading to the prize Rome.
In spite of desperate Allied attacks to break through to Rome, the
German line held. Stalemate ensued. To break the deadlock, a plan
was hatched in early December 1943 at Marrakech to make an
amphibious landing (code named Shingle) at the port of Anzio-
Nettuno, 80 miles north of the Gustav Line and 35 miles south of
Rome. The task force was expected to secure a beachhead and push
twenty miles inland to the Alban Hills. Once in possession of the
hills, it could outflank the German Tenth Army, disrupt the road and
rail links joining the southern German
front and Rome, capture Rome, and thus shorten the war.
 The
British including General Sir Harold R.I.G. Alexander, deputy Allied
commander in chief, Mediterranean Theater, and General Sir Alan
Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff—favored the plan while
the Americans—including Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, commander
of Fifth Army, and Major General John P. Lucas, whom Clark named the
task force commander shortly before the battle—were lukewarm. Clark
and other Americans felt that Fifth Army was already exhausted from
the casualties suffered on the southern front and that adequate
transport and forces for such a hazardous operation could only be
obtained by weakening Overlord. Arguments against Shingle prevailed
and the plan was shelved. But unconvinced of the wisdom of this
action, Prime Minister Winston Churchill promptly revived the plan,
devoting himself to it with Herculean energy. Eisenhower thought him
“almost exclusively responsible” for the Anzio invasion.1 With the
cooperation of President Roosevelt and a reluctant General George C.
Marshall, a Churchilldirected conference in Tunis on December 25,
1943 decided that the invasion would take place after all.
Responsibility for Shingle was assigned to the 36,000-strong U.S. VI
Corps, chiefly comprised of the British 1st and American 3d Infantry
Divisions under Fifth Army. The U.S. 1st Armored Division would
follow immediately after a beachhead was established. Several days
prior to the invasion,a new offensive would be launched
against the Gustav Line. The two fronts were to be linked within
seven days. Frantic preparations for the landing followed.
More »
By W I L L I A M W O O D R U F F |
